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Abstract
Helen Steward holds that an agent’s settling something does not require a conscious, full-fledged intention. 
Rather, sub-intentional acts can be instances of settling by the agent if that act is subordinated to the agent’s 
personal-level conscious systems. I argue that this position is mistaken, and that agential settling does in 
fact require a conscious intention. I argue for this claim by offering a case which on Steward’s position has 
counterintuitive implications. I consider a variety of ways in which Steward might respond, and show how each 
response incurs serious dialectical burdens. I then propose my preferred view of agential settling which does not 
share the aforementioned counterintuitive claims.
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Introduction
In A Metaphysics for Freedom, Helen Steward argues that determinism is false on 
the basis of her notion of settling, a notion which is the central theme of her book. The 
argument may be summarized as follows:
1. If determinism is true, no one settles anything.
2. Humans and nonhuman animals settle things.
3. Therefore, determinism is false.1
1. Steward’s actual argument against determinism is more complicated than what is being presented here, 
though these further complications do not concern what I wish to argue for in this paper. Regardless, 
Steward’s (2012, 12) actual argument against determinism is as follows:
1. If universal determinism is true, the future is not open.
2. If there are self-moving animals, the future is open.
3. There are self-moving animals.
4. Therefore, universal determinism is not true.
 Self-moving animals possess the capacity to move their body whereby their “contribution does amount to 
something over and above the contribution of the process inside them which eventuate in the resulting 
bodily movements” (2012, 16–17).
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Steward (2012, 39–42) distinguishes between a weak and strong account of settling, 
whereby the strong account is employed in premises (1) and (2). According to the weak 
account of settling, there is not necessarily any privileged time at which some event e is 
settled.2 Rather, e can be settled by multiple events that occur at different times, so long 
as these events are part of the causal chain that lead up to e’s occurrence. To illustrate, 
on the weak account of settling, if determinism is true, then the state of the world in 
the remote past in conjunction with the laws of nature settle that my arm rises at t. 
However, my decision in a deterministic world to raise my arm also settles that my arm 
rises at t since my decision is part of the causal chain leading to my arm’s rising at t. In 
other words, an overdetermination of settling by events that occur at distinct times is 
possible on the weak account of settling. By contrast, on the strong account of settling, 
an overdetermination of settling by events that occur at distinct times is impossible. 
According to the strong account of settling, if at time t1 it is nomologically possible 
that e occur at t4, and at t1 it is nomologically possible that e not occur at t4, then at t1 it 
is not settled whether e will occur t4. Let’s further suppose that at t2 it is nomologically 
possible that e occur at t4, but that at t2 it is nomologically impossible that e not occur 
at t4. In that case, whether e occurs at t4 is settled in the strong sense by some event at 
t2. Moreover, given that an overdetermination of settling by events that occur at distinct 
times is impossible on the strong account of settling, since some event at t2 settles that e 
will occur at t4, no event that occurs at t3 can settle that e occurs at t4, including events at 
t3 that cause the occurrence of e at t4.3
Given that Steward is employing the strong account of settling in her argument 
against determinism, premise (1) is undeniably true, and the crucial and controversial 
premise is (2). My disagreement with Steward does not concern the truth of (2). Rather, 
my aim is to express an in-house disagreement between myself and Steward concerning 
the finer details of the strong account of settling (all subsequent discussion of settling 
solely concerns the strong account of settling). More specifically, Steward claims that 
settling does not require a conscious, full-fledged intention. Rather, sub-intentional 
acts can be instances of settling by the agent if that act is subordinated to the agent’s 
personal-level conscious systems. It is this position I wish to dispute.
2. Strictly speaking, Steward holds that that which is settled is not some event e, but rather a question of 
whether-p, whereby p may refer to the proposition that event e occurs (at some time). I will continue to 
speak of events rather than questions being settled merely for brevity’s sake, as this will make no difference 
to the discussion below.
3. For further discussion of these two accounts of settling, see Clancy (2013).
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This paper is divided into four parts. In section 1, I argue that, contra Steward, 
agential settling does in fact require a conscious intention. I argue for this claim by 
offering a case which on Steward’s position has counterintuitive implications. In section 2, 
I consider a number of ways in which Steward might reply to my case. I attempt to show 
that these replies do not succeed insofar as each reply incurs serious dialectical burdens. 
In section 3, I propose my preferred view of settling. Finally, in section 4 I argue that my 
view does an equally good job of supporting Steward’s argument against determinism, 
and, moreover, that my view can offer a more satisfying answer to the luck argument 
against libertarianism.
1. A Problem for the Subordination Thesis
As previously noted, Steward maintains that settling does not require an antecedent 
(or simultaneous) conscious intention (2012, 47).4 To illustrate, consider an agent S’s 
sub-intentional act such as S’s head slightly turning or S’s foot jiggling which are not 
produced by means of S’s conscious intentions. Steward (2012, 50–52) maintains such a 
sub-intentional act by S is nevertheless an instance of settling by S if S’s sub-intentional 
act satisfies a certain condition which is captured in the following thesis:
The Subordination Thesis (ST) Agent S’s sub-intentional act A is 
settled by S if X is causally responsible for the occurrence of A, and X 
is subordinated to S’s personal-level conscious systems insofar as S can 
consciously alter or prevent altogether the occurrence of A.5
My argument against ST appeals to what I’ll call a Reverse Frankfurt case in light 
of the fact that my case reverses some of the structural features of Frankfurt’s (1969) 
case against the principle of alternative possibilities.6 Before I present this case, however, 
I must first present Jennifer Hornsby’s (1980) distinction between transitive and 
intransitive verbs—a distinction which Steward herself accepts and employs. Roughly, 
4. Steward does not say explicitly whether she understands a decision to be the formation of an intention, or 
simply the intention itself. Regardless, in light of affirming the subordination thesis, Steward clearly thinks 
that agential settling requires neither an intention nor the formation of an intention.
5. In Steward (2009), although the notion of settling is not employed, Steward similarly defends the position 
that sub-intentional actions are things we do—they are actions.
6. In Frankfurt’s (1969) case, an agent allegedly cannot do otherwise given the presence of a preemptive 
intervener, even though the preemptive intervener stands idly by and never in fact intervenes. By contrast, 
in my Reverse Frankfurt case, an agent can do otherwise, even though an intervener is intervening.
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a transitive verb refers to someone’s doing something, and an intransitive verb refers to 
something happening. Here are two examples: the chair movedI (something happened 
to the chair) because I movedT the chair (I did something). My foot jiggledI (something 
happened to my foot) because I jiggledT it (I did something). With this distinction in 
hand, I now present my Reverse Frankfurt case:
Reverse Frankfurt Jones is concentrating intensely on an exam 
she is currently taking, and has no interest in focusing her attention 
elsewhere. Unbeknownst to Jones, Black has placed a computer chip 
in Jones’ brain which in turn might cause Jones’ foot to jiggleI if Black 
presses a button. However, this chip is causally inert when it conflicts 
with Jones’ conscious intentions: if Jones forms an intention to refrain 
from jigglingT her foot, the jigglingI will not occur even if Black presses 
the button. Hence, the chip is subordinated to Jones’ personal-level 
conscious systems insofar as Jones can consciously alter or prevent 
altogether the jigglingI. 
Given the fairly uncontroversial assumption that simultaneous 
causation is metaphysically possible (Taylor 1966; Brand 1980; Huemer 
and Kovitz 2003), the following is true:7 Black’s pressing of the button 
at time t deterministically causes the chip in Jones’ brain to activate 
at t. Additionally, if at t the chip in Jones’ brain activates and Jones 
has not formed an intention to refrain from jigglingT her foot, then the 
chip deterministically causes Jones’ foot to jiggleI at t. So, at time t the 
following occurs:
• Black presses the button.
• The chip in Jones’ brain activates.
• Jones does not form (and has not formed) an intention to 
refrain from jigglingT her foot.
• Jones’ foot jigglesI.
7. Steward would surely not want her account of settling to be committed to the metaphysical impossibility 
of simultaneous causation. At any rate, such a commitment would certainly seem to be a cost to her view.
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ST renders the verdict that Jones’ jigglingI is settled by Jones. Moreover, ST also seems 
to suggest that Black’s pressing of the button does not settle that Jones’ foot jigglesI 
precisely because the jigglingI is settled by Jones. For, it would appear that only one agent 
can settle some event if we wish to maintain that an agent settles some event if and only 
if it is up to the agent whether the event in question occur. At any rate, irrespective of 
what Steward might say about Black, her commitment to ST commits her to the claim 
that Jones’ jigglingI is (at least) settled by Jones. This verdict is counterintuitive. Jones is 
concentrating intensely on an exam and is paying no attention to how her body might 
move in some trivial manner. As a result, if Jones’ jigglingI is settled by an agent, it is at 
best settled by Black rather than Jones. In light of ST’s counterintuitive implications, I will 
now consider two ways in which Steward might attempt to modify ST in order to render 
the intuitively correct verdict in Reverse Frankfurt that Jones’ jigglingI is not settled by 
Jones.
2. Revising the Subordination Thesis
In order to render the intuitively correct verdict in Reverse Frankfurt while also 
maintaining that in ordinary circumstances we often settle how our body moves in the 
absence of a conscious decision or intention, Steward may wish to modify ST in the 
following manner:
The Subordination Thesis 2 (ST2) Agent S’s sub-intentional act A 
is settled by S if X is causally responsible for the occurrence of agent 
S’s sub-intentional act A, and X is subordinated to S’s personal-
level conscious systems insofar as S can consciously alter or prevent 
altogether the occurrence of A, and X does not involve in any direct 
way the intentions of other agents.
ST2 is meant to be understood in such a way that Jones’ jigglingI is not settled by Jones 
because Black’s intentions are involved in some direct way with Jones’ jigglingI. The 
notion of ‘not involving in any direct way’ is, among other things, undoubtedly vague. 
But never mind that. There are two more urgent problems with ST2. 
First, a worry arises that affirming ST2 would thereby undermine the manipulation 
argument which is one of the more powerful arguments for incompatibilism. In a 
nutshell, that argument claims that if S’s action is manipulated by other agents, then 
S is not morally responsible8 for that action. Moreover, there is no relevant difference 
8. The kind of responsibility at issue here is basic desert responsibility. To be responsible in the basic desert 
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between a case of manipulation and an ordinary case in which one acts in a deterministic 
universe. So compatibilism is false (Pereboom 2014, §4). If Steward accepts ST2, however, 
this opens up a ‘soft-line’ reply to the manipulation argument, according to which there 
is a relevant difference between an instance of manipulation and an ordinary case in 
which one acts in a deterministic universe. The difference is that only in an instance of 
manipulation are one’s actions causally determined by factors beyond one’s control, 
whereby such factors involve in some direct way the intentions of other agents (Lycan 
1997). While I don’t find this response to the manipulation argument compelling, it 
appears that if Steward adopts ST2, then she cannot consistently object to this soft-line 
reply to the manipulation argument. For, both a proponent of ST2 and a proponent of the 
above soft-line reply accept importantly similar claims. One accepts that the intentions 
of other agents can make a difference with respect to whether S settles something. The 
other accepts that the intentions of other agents can make a difference with respect to 
whether S is morally responsible for what she has done.
The second problem with ST2 is that, like the above soft-line reply, it seems ad hoc. 
Suppose that Black is replaced with a spontaneously emergent robotic machine that 
was not produced by an intelligent designer, and that the robotic machine causes Jones’ 
jigglingI (Pereboom 2001, 115; 2014, 79). Alternatively, suppose that a spontaneously 
generated electromagnetic field directly causes the jigglingI (Mele 1995, 168–169; 2006, 
141). Moreover, suppose that both the robotic machine and the electromagnetic field are 
subordinated to Jones’ personal-level conscious systems. Surely these cases can’t make 
the difference with respect to whether Jones’ jigglingI is settled by Jones. ST2 is thus 
untenable.
Steward might attempt to modify ST in a different way in order to escape the 
problems with ST2. Accordingly, such an amendment to ST must not invoke the notion 
of agency or action. For, it is plausible that such notions involve in a direct way the 
intentions of other agents. In that case, irrespective of the finer details of such an 
amendment, that amendment will entail the following:
The Subordination Thesis 3 (ST3) Agent S’s sub-intentional act A 
is settled by S if X is causally responsible for the occurrence of agent 
S’s sub-intentional act A, and X is subordinated to S’s personal-
level conscious systems insofar as S can consciously alter or prevent 
sense for performing an action is to deserve blame or credit just because one understands the moral status 
of the action one has performed, and not because of consequentialist or contractualist considerations 
(Scanlon 2013; Pereboom 2014). 
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altogether the occurrence of A, and X satisfies some further condition c, 
such that c does not invoke the notion of agency or action.
ST3 seems to escape the charge of being ad hoc which I claimed plagues ST2. However, 
in the context of Steward’s aims, ST3 has its own serious problem, as I will now explain. 
Steward argues extensively against the causal theory of action (Davidson 1973; Frankfurt 
1988; Bishop 1989; Velleman 2000), which Steward understands to be the thesis that “[f]
or an agent to act is roughly…for the bodily movements that are intrinsic to the relevant 
action to be caused by certain of that agent’s own mental states” (2012, 55). Steward 
endorses the two prevalent objections to the causal theory of action.
The first objection is that the appropriate manner in which an agent’s mental states 
must cause one’s bodily behavior in order to count as an action must be further specified. 
Davidson’s (1973) classic illustration of this point involves a climber who is holding a rope 
to which another person is tied and who is endangering the climber. The climber wants to 
rid herself of this person, and could do so by loosening her grip of the rope. The climber’s 
relevant beliefs and desires result in the climber’s being extremely nervous, which in turn 
results in the climber unintentionally loosening her grip of the rope. In this example, the 
climber’s loosening her grip of the rope was not an intentional action because her beliefs 
and desires did not cause the climber’s bodily movements in the appropriate manner. This 
is the problem of deviant causal chains.
The second and closely related objection to the causal theory of action is that it in 
principle cannot provide  necessary and sufficient conditions for when an agent does 
anything, i.e. where the agent—and not just her mental states—is responsible for the 
agent’s relevant bodily movements. For, once the relevant mental states play their role 
in causing the agent’s bodily movements, there’s nothing left for the agent to do. This is 
sometimes called the disappearing agent objection (Hornsby 2004).
Now, Steward finds both objections to the causal theory of action persuasive, and, 
crucially, claims that neither objection can be answered so long as the proponent of the 
causal theory of action provides necessary and sufficient conditions for action which 
do not invoke the notion of agency or action (Steward 2012, 55–66). In other words, 
appealing only to the agent’s mental states and their causal relation to the agent’s bodily 
movements will always in principle leave out what we were after, viz. the agent’s doing 
something. Steward invests a great deal in arguing against the causal theory of action 
precisely because it is a compatibilist-friendly one. So, it would be a great cost to Steward 
if she had to give up the two aforementioned objections to the causal theory of action. 
However, I claim that this is exactly what Steward must do if ST3 is endorsed. 
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ST3 entails that there is some condition which is not met in Reverse Frankfurt, and 
yet is met in ordinary cases in which our sub-intentional acts are not directly caused 
by other agents, such that Jones’ jigglingI is not settled by Jones, but an agent’s sub-
intentional act in an ordinary case is an instance of settling by the agent. The relevant 
event or property that satisfies this condition must surely involve a certain way in which 
one’s mental states cause one’s bodily movements. In other words, the way in which 
one’s bodily movements are caused (by one’s mental states) makes the critical difference 
between that which is, and is not, an instance of settling. But it seems to me that ST3 
opens up the door for the proponent of the causal theory of action to appeal to the exact 
same condition as making the critical difference between bodily movements that are and 
are not an action. Moreover, this condition is, ex hypothesi, one that is consistent with 
the causal theory of action precisely because this condition does not invoke any notions 
of agency or action. So I conclude that endorsing ST3 would come at too great a cost for 
Steward given that her argument against the truth of determinism depends significantly 
upon refuting the causal theory of action. It seems, then, that there is good reason for 
Steward to give up ST and any variant thereof.
3. The Cartesian View of Settling
Since the proponent of Steward’s argument against the truth of determinism should 
not endorse ST (or a variant of ST), I think the following position ought to be endorsed 
instead:
Cartesian Settling (CS) Necessarily, an agent S settles some 
contingent event e only if e is preceded by (or is simultaneous with) a 
conscious intention by S to perform action a,9 such that either (i) the 
occurrence of a at time t is identical to e, (ii) the occurrence of a at time 
t is identical to event e* which necessitates e, or (iii) a deterministically 
causes e, and S believed that a might cause e.
Note that the above view is Cartesian only insofar as it emphasizes the role of the mind 
with respect to settling. This view is perfectly consistent with physicalism about the mind. 
For, nothing about CS requires that the conscious intention of the agent be a non-physical 
state. Moreover, this view is consistent with Steward’s (2012, 16–17) view that agential 
9. For simplicity’s sake, I assume that an omission can be an action. If one disagrees, then CS could no doubt 
be appropriately tailored to accommodate such disagreement. I will further discuss the issue of intentional 
omissions below. 
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settling involves a kind of top-down causation that is over and above the causal processes 
that constitute the agent. To be clear, however, CS in no way requires top-down causation 
since CS is also consistent with a reductionist view of agency and settling (Franklin 2014).
In order to attain a better grasp of CS, let’s consider the three kinds of ways in which 
an agent can settle something. Suppose Haley forms the intention to raiseT her arm at t in 
order to get a taxi driver’s attention, and Haley succeeds in raisingT her arm and getting 
the taxi driver’s attention. According to condition (i) of CS, Haley settles the occurrence 
of the following event: Haley’s raisingT her arm at t. Next, given the relationship between 
transitive and intransitive verbs, Haley’s raisingT her arm at t necessitates Haley’s arm 
risingI at t. So according to condition (ii) of CS, Haley settles that Haley’s arm risesI at t. 
Finally, consider the event of the taxi driver noticing Haley’s signal. Haley’s raisingT her 
arm is, let’s suppose, a deterministic cause of the taxi driver’s noticing Haley’s signal. 
Moreover, Haley believed that raisingT her arm might cause the taxi driver to notice 
Haley’s signal. So, according to condition (iii) of CS, it follows that Haley settled the 
occurrence of the taxi driver noticing Haley’s signal.10
Now, in Reverse Frankfurt, Jones has no intention to jiggleT her foot, or to perform 
some action that entails that her foot jigglesI, or to perform some action which Jones 
believes might cause her foot to jiggleI. So CS renders the correct verdict that Jones does 
not settle her foot’s jigglingI. Additionally, since Black intentionally presses the button, 
the pressing of the button deterministically causes Jones’ foot to jiggleI (in the absence 
of certain intentions by Jones), and Black believes that pressing the button might cause 
Jones’ foot to jiggleI, according to condition (iii) of CS it follows that Black settles that 
Jones’ foot jigglesI. So unlike ST, CS renders all of the intuitively correct verdicts in Reverse 
Frankfurt.
Before proceeding to the final section, I want to consider some important objections 
to CS. In order for an agent to settle something, certain factors outside of an agent’s 
control intuitively need to obtain. For instance, suppose that Haley raisedT her arm at 
time t, and there was a bomb nearby, such that it was nomologically possible for the 
bomb to explode at t (suppose that whether the bomb explodes at t depends upon 
certain genuinely indeterministic processes at the microphysical level). Call this The Bomb 
Case. Whether the bomb explodes at t is not up to Haley. Moreover, it is not up to Haley 
that if the bomb explodes, then Haley does not raiseT her arm at t. We might be tempted 
to conclude that whether Haley raisesT her arm at t is therefore not up to Haley. After 
10. I have added a belief component to (iii) since I acknowledge that an agent’s power to settle something 
partly depends upon an agent’s beliefs (Shabo 2014).  
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all, this line of reasoning resembles a transfer of powerlessness principle employed in 
the consequence argument for the incompatibility of determinism and the ability to do 
otherwise (van Inwagen 1983). There is, however, a crucial difference between the above 
line of reasoning and the employment of a transfer of powerlessness principle. Haley’s 
raisingT her arm at t and not raisingT her arm at t are each nomologically possible prior to 
t. Moreover, if certain conditions beyond Haley’s control which are nomologically possible 
obtain, then it is up to Haley whether she raisesT her arm at t. So, while Haley no doubt 
has a limited kind of control over whether she raisesT her arm at t, we can nevertheless 
maintain that Haley settles that she raisesT her arm at t in The Bomb Case. By contrast, 
if determinism is true then either it is nomologically impossible just prior to t (and at t) 
that Haley raiseT her arm at t, or it is nomologically impossible just prior to t (and at t) 
that Haley not raiseT her arm at t. So, CS is consistent with the view that no one settles 
anything (according to the strong account of settling) if determinism is true.11 I now turn 
to another objection that arises in light of the remarks just made.
I have just claimed that CS is consistent with the following thesis: 
The Limited Settling Thesis Possibly, an agent S settles that S ϕ-s 
even when S’s ϕ-ing partly depends upon factors beyond S’s control.
A worry now arises that the proponent of ST can stand firm in asserting that Jones 
settles that Jones’ foot jigglesI in Reverse Frankfurt. For, while Black is certainly a cause 
of Jones’ foot jigglingI, Black’s intervention is still nomologically compossible with Jones’ 
foot not jigglingI. For, if Jones forms the intention not to jiggleT her foot, then Jones’ foot 
will not jiggleI, irrespective of whether Black intervenes. So, although whether Jones’ foot 
jigglesI partly depends upon factors beyond Jones’ control (given that Jones doesn’t form 
an intention not to jiggleT her foot), it doesn’t follow that the jigglingI is not settled by 
Jones.
In response, I contend that there is still a crucial difference between Reverse Frankfurt 
and The Bomb Case. In Reverse Frankfurt, Jones omits from jigglingT her foot. However, 
this omission is not intentional since Jones has no intention which is in any important way 
11. I am intentionally side-stepping recent intricate issues concerning Joseph Campbell’s (2007) ‘no past’ 
objection to the consequence argument, according to which the consequence argument does not 
demonstrate that an agent cannot do otherwise in a deterministic world since it is possible for an agent 
to perform an action at the first moment of time in a deterministic universe without being causally 
determined by factors beyond the agent’s control to perform the relevant action. For a variety of responses 
to Campbell, see Brueckner (2008), Loss (2009; 2010), Bailey (2012), and Finch (2013). The present 
discussion can be appropriately tailored according to each reply.
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relevant to Jones’ foot not jigglingI (Clarke 2010). If, however, Jones intentionally refrained 
from jigglingT her foot, then Jones’ foot would certainly not have jiggledI, despite Black’s 
intervention. Hence, while Jones’ jigglingI in Reverse Frankfurt happens to partly depend 
upon factors beyond her control (viz. Black’s intervention), and while Haley’s raisingT her 
arm in The Bomb Case likewise partly depends upon factors beyond her control (viz. the 
bomb not exploding), there is still a relevant difference between these two cases. Jones’ 
jigglingI was not preceded by (or was simultaneous with) a relevant conscious intention 
by Jones. By contrast, Haley’s arm risingI was preceded by (or was simultaneous with) 
a relevant conscious intention by Haley. It is this difference between Reverse Frankfurt 
and The Bomb Case that should lead us to conclude that Jones’ jigglingI was not settled 
by Jones in Reverse Frankfurt, but Haley’s arm risingI was settled by Haley in The Bomb 
Case. So, The Limited Settling Thesis should not lead us astray from the importance 
of intentions for agential settling. I now turn to the final section in which I show that 
CS does an equally good job of supporting Steward’s argument against determinism, 
and, moreover, that CS can offer a more satisfying answer to the luck argument against 
libertarianism.
4. Cartesian Settling and Libertarianism
Steward emphasizes ST partly because she thinks ST poses a further obstacle to the 
compatibilist who adopts a causal theory of action. As we’ve seen, the causal theory 
of action is supposed to analyze actions in terms of some appropriate causal relation 
between the agent’s mental states and her bodily movements. But sub-intentional acts 
are not causally produced by the agent’s (conscious) mental states. So the causal theory 
of action must be false since it cannot accommodate sub-intentional acts (Steward 2012, 
66–67).
If this was an intractable problem for the causal theory of action, then ST would have 
an advantage over CS insofar as only the proponent of ST can pose the aforementioned 
objection to the causal theory of action. But this problem is tractable. The proponent of 
the causal theory of action could revise her view in the following manner. An agent’s sub-
intentional act involves bodily movements that are causally produced by physical states 
within the agent. And these physical states are subordinated to the agent’s personal-level 
conscious systems insofar as the agent’s relevant mental states can modify or prevent 
altogether the agent’s relevant bodily movements by nullifying the causal efficacy of the 
agent’s relevant physical states.
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This proposal analyzes the subordination of sub-intentional actions in terms of the 
causal efficacy of the agent’s mental states. As a result, this proposal does not seem 
ad hoc, and moreover does not stray too far off from spirit of the causal theory of 
action which emphasizes the causal efficacy of an agent’s mental states. So I conclude 
that Steward’s objection to the causal theory of action with regards to sub-intentional 
acts fails, and thus that ST has no advantages over CS within the context of arguing 
for libertarianism. However, as I will now try to show, besides rendering the intuitively 
correct verdicts in Reverse Frankfurt, CS has a further advantage over ST.
There are a variety of luck arguments against libertarianism, the core of which is 
formulated by Franklin (2011, 201) as follows:
1. If an action is undetermined, then it is a matter of luck.
2. If an action is a matter of luck, then it is not free.
If (1) and (2) are true, undetermined actions cannot be free, and thus libertarianism is 
false. How might the libertarian respond? There is a trend in the literature to highlight 
the fact that a free action involves an action or that a free action is the agent’s in order 
to undermine the luck argument as well as related arguments against libertarianism 
(Balaguer 2009; Franklin 2011; Griffith 2010). But there is reason to think that this 
response is inadequate, and that libertarians need something more, such as an account 
of how an agent can determine, select, or (to put it in Steward’s terms) settle between 
the relevant multiple courses of action available to the agent (Schlosser 2014). More 
specifically, the libertarian arguably needs to adequately demarcate instances of agential 
settling from truly random outcomes (Shabo 2013). 
In response to this challenge (and the luck argument) the CS proponent can say that, 
unlike truly random outcomes, agential settling necessarily involves a conscious intention, 
whereby doing something intentionally involves doing something for a reason (Davidson 
1963; Goldman 1970; Mele 1992).12 In other words, CS arguably implies that, unlike a 
truly random outcome, agential settling necessarily has a teleological explanation. I think 
this response has some merit (Lowe 2006; Goetz 2008). The trouble, however, for the ST 
proponent is that they cannot adopt this response. Sub-intentional acts do not require an 
intention on behalf of the agent. So they need not have a teleological explanation at all. 
But according to ST such sub-intentional acts can be instances of settling by the agent. 
12. There are a variety of accounts—both causal and non-causal—of the relationship between an agent’s 
action and her motivational reason for performing that action. I do not intend to take a stand on this issue 
here.
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So, according to ST, agential settling does not necessarily have a teleological explanation. 
Hence, in comparison to the proponent of ST, the proponent of CS is better situated 
to respond to the luck argument (and related arguments) against libertarianism. More 
specifically, the CS proponent can point to a feature that is essential to agential settling 
which aids in demarcating agential settling from a truly random outcome. So I conclude 
that CS does an equally good job of supporting Steward’s argument against determinism, 
and, moreover, that CS offers a more satisfying answer to the luck argument (and related 
arguments) against libertarianism. Steward thus has good reason to abandon ST in favor 
of CS.13
13. For helpful discussion and comments on a previous draft of this paper, I’m grateful to Kim Frost, Sean 
Clancy and the audience at the 2014 Free Will conference hosted by the Center for Cognition and 
Neuroethics.
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